The Municipal Budgetary Response to Changing Labor Costs: The Case of San Francisco by Katz, Harry C.
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Faculty Publications - Labor Relations, Law, and 
History Labor Relations, Law, and History 
July 1979 
The Municipal Budgetary Response to Changing Labor Costs: The 
Case of San Francisco 
Harry C. Katz 
Cornell University, hck2@cornell.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cbpubs 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Labor Relations, Law, and History at 
DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications - Labor Relations, Law, and History 
by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
The Municipal Budgetary Response to Changing Labor Costs: The Case of San 
Francisco 
Abstract 
"This paper analyzes how expenditures of the city of San Francisco were altered in response to changes 
in municipal labor costs over the period 1945 through 1976. A hybrid of the "demands" and the 
"organizational" models of budgeting is used to measure the budgetary response to changes in the 
relative prices of labor inputs. Descriptive and econometric evidence reveals significant adjustments both 
among and within departments in reaction to changes in relative labor costs. The empirical evidence 
demonstrates that the city's budgetary process is guided by simple allocative rules modified by price-
responsive adjustments." 
Keywords 
San Francisco, labor, municipal, cost, budget, price, department, rule, model, expenditure, adjustment 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Katz, H.C. (1979). The municipal budgetary response to changing labor costs: The case of San Francisco. 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 32, 506-519. 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cb/34/ 
Required Publisher Statement 
Copyright by Cornell University. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cbpubs/34 
THE MUNICIPAL BUDGETARY RESPONSE TO 
CHANGING LABOR COSTS: 
THE CASE OF SAN FRANCISCO 
HARRY C. KATZ 
A CADEMIC literature on the topic of budgeting in public agencies is 
sharply divided into two schools of thought 
-that focusing on the "organizational" (or 
bureaucratic) model and that focusing on 
the "demands" (or expenditure) model. The 
organizational model looks at budgetary 
expenditures as an outcome of a bureau- 
cratic process, involving factors such as 
standard operating procedures and rules of 
thumb. The demands model, on the other 
hand, places the determination of public 
expenditures in an economic framework, 
often based on the assumption that voter 
preferences determine expenditure deci- 
This paper analyzes how expenditures of the city of 
San Francisco were altered in response to changes in 
municipal labor costs over the period 1945 through 
1976. A hybrid of the "demands" and the "organiza- 
tional" models of budgeting is used to measure the 
budgetary response to changes in the relative prices of 
labor inputs. Desaiptive and econometric evidence 
reveals significant adjustments both among and with- 
in departments in reaction to changes in relative labor 
costs. The empirical evidence demonstrates that the 
city's budgetary process is guided by simple allocative 
rules modified by price-responsive adjustments. 
Harry C. Katz is Assistant Professor of Economics 
and Management at Massachusetts Institute of Tech- 
nology. He is grateful to Michael Wiseman, Mark 
Kamlet, Henry Farber, Bennett Harrison, and rnem- 
bers of the Harvard Labor Workshop for helpful sug- 
gestions. Financial support for this research was pro- 
vided by a Department of Labor grant, but the author 
is solely responsible for the contents of the paper.- 
EDITOR 
sions. Working with the latter model, it 
becomes possible to speak of income and 
price elasticities of the demand for public 
services. 
This paper uses a hybrid of those two 
models to analyze how the budget of thecity 
and county of San Francisco changed in the 
post-World War 11 period in response to 
changes in municipal labor costs.' We rely 
heavily on the organizational model as a 
framework for the analysis and assert that 
budgetary allocations are largely a function 
of simple rules of thumb, which can be ap- 
proximated by a constant shares decision 
rule. Departments are said to receive rough- 
ly a constant share of the increase in the total 
city budget and, within departments, labor's 
share also tends to be set as a constant frac- 
tion of total department expenditures. Price 
effects enter the model, however, as a factor 
that causes some readjustments in the allo- 
cation of department shares of the total city 
budget and labor's share of the expenditures 
of individual departments. Although basi- 
cally relying on simple rules to guide their 
decisions, this model's decision makers 
adjust their rules in response to changes in 
the absolute and relative prices of inputs. 
The model is tested utilizing budgetary 
appropriations of the city of San Francisco 
'San Francisco is incorporated as a city and county; 
throughout this paper reference will be to the city of 
San Francisco. 
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from 1945 - 76. Large absolute and relative 
changes occurred in the wages and pensions 
received by various municipal employee 
groups in San Francisco in the post-World 
War I1 period.* In particular, the wages and 
pensions of police officers, firefighters, 
transit drivers, and craft workers rose rap- 
idly relative to both the consumer price in- 
dex and the wages and pensions of other 
"miscellaneous" city  employee^.^ For ex- 
ample, from 1945 to 1976 the dollar base 
salary and pension costs of general laborers 
(a representative craft job title), police offi- 
cers, firefighters, and transit drivers in- 
creased, respectively, 771, 921, 887, and 769 
percent. Over the same period the base 
salary and pension costs of clerk typists and 
assistant engineers (two representative 
miscellaneous employee job titles) increased 
339 and 356 percent, respectively. On aver- 
age, the pay increases received by police 
officers, firefighters, transit drivers, and 
craft workers were two to two and a half 
times greater than those received by miscel- 
laneous employees over the post-World War 
I1 period. 
Both the wages and pensions of San Fran- 
cisco municipal employees have historically 
been set by charter-mandated formulas that 
have been altered periodically in municipal 
elections. For example, in accordance with 
the city's "craft pay" formula, from 1945 
through 1975 city craft workers' hourly 
wages were set equal to the hourly wages 
received by unionized craft workers in the 
private sector in San Francisco. Reliance 
on charter pay formulas to set city employee 
pay ensured that pay determination was 
procedurally separated from the budgetary 
process that set personnel and budgetary 
allocations. The timing of pay and budget 
determination also differed. Employee pay 
was largely determined in the spring of each 
2For a detailed reporting of municipal labor costs in 
the city of San Francisco and a history of the institu- 
tional factors associated with those costs for the years 
1945 through 1976, see Harry C. Katz, "Municipal Pay 
Determination: The Case of San Francisco," Indw- 
trial Relations, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter 1979), pp. 44- 58. 
'The category, "miscellaneous" employees, in- 
cludes all city employees who are not craft workers, 
police officers, firefighters, or transit drivers. Roughly 
two-thirds of the city's total workforce fit into this 
category. 
fiscal year while budget allocations typi- 
cally were not finally determined until the 
summer or early 
Public sector labor relations in San Fran- 
cisco are noteworthy because of the histor- 
ical lack of either formalized bargaining or 
the signing of contracts between city offi- 
cials and employee representatives. This 
pattern has precluded any direct route by 
which public employees or their union rep- 
resentatives could influence personnel or 
budget allocations through contract restric- 
tions. Although city employees and their 
representatives often lobbied before city 
officials in an attempt to influence budg- 
etary allocations, there is little evidence 
that their lobbying efforts ever had much 
effect. The fact that employee pay deter- 
mination came before and was separated 
from the budgetary process, plus the absence 
of direct channels by which employees could 
influence budgetary allocations, make it 
possible to view the price of labor as an ex- 
ogenous variable in our model of the city's 
budgetary process. 
There are several channels through which 
changes in rates of employee compensation 
can affect budgetary allocations. First, 
changes in the absolute level of the price of 
labor to the city may affect the level of total 
city expenditures. Second, changes in rela- 
tive prices of labor inputs may change inter- 
department budgetary allocations. Finally, 
changes in absolute and relative prices of 
labor may alter intradepartmental alloca- 
tions and change the share of expenditures 
in individual departments paid to labor. 
With descriptive and econometric evi- 
dence we will trace the extent to which the 
city has utilized each of these channels in 
response to changing labor costs. Before 
proceeding to a discussion of the data, how- 
ever, we will review briefly the organiza- 
tional and demands models of budgeting. 
The Models 
The demands model argues that external 
forces, such as voter preferences, rather than 
'A description and chronology of the budget process 
in San Francisco is provided in Richard Hayes, Under- 
standing San Francisco's Budget (San Francisco: San 
Francisco Study Center, 1973). 
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internal organizational pressures, are the 
crucial determinants of expenditures. In 
their crudest form, however, demands 
models- do not specify any formal associa- 
tion between external factors and expendi- 
ture decisions. Absent any formal model, 
researchers have often attempted only to 
identify the correlations between such ex- 
ternal factors as the tax base or demographic 
characteristics and public expenditures.5 
Extensions of these simple models have 
attempted to formally link voter preferences 
and expenditure decisions. Utilizing formal 
voter models (most often the median-voter 
model), they measure income and price 
elasticities of the demand for public services 
that are analogous to demand elasticities 
measured for market commodities.6 Some- 
times these models measure the price elas- 
ticity of demand as a "tax price" elasticity, 
which reflects voters' response to variations 
in the share of property taxes that is alleg- 
edly placed on the shoulders of business, 
nonresidents or other  nonvoter^.^ Other 
cross-sectional studies use variations in 
labor costs to measure price elasticities, 
although data limitations often limit at- 
tempts to measure price elasticities that arise 
in response to variations in the cost of pro- 
ducing public services across jurisdictions.8 
Generally, these cross-sectional studies 
conclude that the demand for labor in the 
public sector is price inelastic. 
5This literature, which is rather extensive, is surveyed 
in Werner Hirsch, The Economics of State and Local 
Government (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970). See 
especially Alan Campbell and Seymour Sacks, Metro- 
politan America: Fiscal Patterns and Governmental 
Systems (New York: Free Press, 1967). 
S e e  Theodore Bergstrom and Robert Goodman, 
"Private Demands for Public Goods," American 
Economic Review, Vol. 63, No. 3(June 1973), pp. 280- 
96; Thomas Borcherding and Robert Deacon, "The 
Demand for the Services of Non-Federal Govern- 
ments," American Economic Review, Vol. 63, No. 5 
(December 1972), pp. 891 - 901; and Ronald Ehrenberg, 
"The Demand for State and Local Government Em- 
ployees," American Economic Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 
(June 1973), pp. 366- 79. 
'See Bergstrom and Goodman, "Private Demands 
for Public Goods," and John Bowman, "Tax Exporta- 
bility, Intergovernmental Aid and School Finance 
Reform," National Tax Journal, Vol. 27, No. 2 
(June 1974), pp. 163 - 73. 
Variations in statewide average payroll costs are 
used to measure price variations in Ehrenberg, "The 
Demand for State . . . Employees." 
A major flaw within the demands model 
is the implausibility of its assumptions. It 
seems inappropriate to characterize public 
agencies as optimizers of an abstract objec- 
tive function. Nor does it appear fruitful to 
view the actions of public agencies as a 
direct expression of voter preferences. Or- 
ganizational forces must be taken into ac- 
count in any realistic explanation of the 
behavior of public agencies. 
The organizational model of budgeting 
is based on Simon's analysis of administra- 
tive b e h a ~ i o r . ~  The model of organizational 
behavior has been extended to the level of 
individual behavior in the literature on 
cybernetic decision making.I0 These models 
focus on the process of decision making 
within the bureaucratic hierarchy and the 
human mind. In this literature one finds 
concern for the role of standard operating 
procedures, rules of thumb, and the domi- 
nance of forces that place limits on the abil- 
ity of actors to perform maximizing cal- 
culations. 
Researchers such as Crecine, Wildavsky, 
and Lindblom have extended the organiza- 
tional model to argue that bureaucratic 
behavior leads to budget outcomes that 
are largely derived from an incremental 
process." For national and local govern- 
ments, public budget determination has 
been modeled as a process that. involves 
simple linear decision rules.'2 Taken at 
fat; value, these models suggest that deci- 
sion makers inside the government bureau- 
cracy do not readily respond either to ex- 
ternal pressures or to changes in the prices of 
production inputs. 
5 e e  Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior 
(New York: MacMillan, 1957). 
'Osee John Steinbrunner, The Cybernetic Theory of 
Decision-Making (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1974). 
lLSee John Crecine, Government Problem Solving: 
A Computer Simulation of Municipal Budgeting 
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969); Aaron Wildavsky, 
Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary 
Processes (Boston: Little, Brown. 1975); and Charles 
Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through','' 
Public Administration Review, Vol. 19 (Spring 1959), 
pp. 79 - 88. 
I7See Otto Davis, M.A.H. Dempster and Aaron 
Wildavsky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," 
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 60, 
No. 3 (September 1966), pp. 529 - 47. 
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Organizational models have heretofore 
largely ignored consideration of factors that 
induce changes in the rules of thumb em- 
ployed by decision makers. Simple rules 
may guide the behavior of actors while at the 
same time rational factors, such as price 
effects, may lead to adjustments in those 
rules.lS Such price effects as the shift of ex- 
penditures away from departments that 
utilize relatively expensive labor may be an 
important rational adjustment present in 
the budgetary process. 
Rather than merely speculate as to pos- 
sible rational explanations for bureaucratic 
behavior, it is possible to test for the influ- 
ence of rational factors on the bureaucratic 
rules. Relying on neither a rigid behavioral 
rule nor an elaborate rationalist explana- 
tion, a merging of the two models may pro- 
vide a more accurate description of causal 
factors.14 We therefore test a model in which 
budgetary allocations are largely set by con- 
stant shares rules, but in which price effects 
are allowed to cause adjustments in those 
constant shares rules. 
Description of Data 
T o  analyze the city's response to changes 
in labor prices we traced personnel totals 
and budgetary allocations in a sample of 
eighteen city departments over the period 
1945 - 76.15 The departments studied were 
')For a mathematical model of behavior rules, see 
Roy Radner, "A Behavioral Model of Cost Reduc- 
tion," The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 6, No. 4 
(Spring 1975), pp. 196 - 215. 
14A different sort of demands and organizational 
model is used to explain municipal budget data in 
John Jackson, "Politics and the Budgetary Process," 
Social Science Research, Vol. 1, No. 1 (April 1972), 
pp. 35 - 60. Jackson's model differs from ours in that it 
ignores price effects in the budgetary process. For a 
discussion of maximization models of bureaucratic 
behavior, see William Orzechowski, "Economic 
Models of Bureaucracy: Survey, Extensions, and 
Evidence," in Thomas Borcherding, ed., Budgets and 
Bureaunats: The Sources of Government Growth, 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977). pp. 
229 - 59. 
15The budget for the municipal railway (MUNI) 
is set differently from other department expenditures. 
The Public Utilities Commission-not the Board of 
Supervisors-sets the MUNI budget, which is strongly 
influenced by the availability of federal grants. For this 
reason we exclude MUNI from our model of depart- 
Fire, Police, Municipal Railway (MUNI), 
Electricity, Sewage and Waste Treatment, 
Street Cleaning, Sewer Repair, Street Re- 
pair, Parks and Recreation, Assessor, City 
Attorney, District Attorney, Mayor, Board 
of Supervisors, Purchasing, Controller, 
Civil Service Commission, and the Public 
Library. 
School expenditures were excluded be- 
cause an independent school board-not 
city officials-regulates school expendi- 
tures in San Francisco. Expenditures on 
hospitals and welfare were also excluded 
because they are heavily influenced by state 
and federal grants and the regulations as- 
sociated with those grants, and city officials 
therefore have limited discretion over them. 
In addition, capital construction expendi- 
tures were excluded from our analysis, be- 
cause the city's capital expenditures on 
construction are listed in a separate city 
budget in a manner that makes it impossible 
to allocate the expenditures to particular 
departments. 
City expenditures on items other than 
schools, hospitals, welfare, and capital con- 
struction compose a "discretionary" com- 
ponent of the city's budget. It is this discre- 
tionary city budget that is the focus of our 
analysis. In 1976, the total city budget in San 
Francisco was $734.1 million;l6 the discre- 
tionary city budget was $298.8 million or 
40.7 percent of the total. In terms of per- 
sonnel, however, the departments included 
in the discretionary city budget are much 
more important, making up 66 percent of 
the permanent employees funded by the 
total city budget in 1976.1' 
ment appropriations. (We do, however, include MUNI 
in our observation of department personnel totals in 
Table 1.) 
16We excluded public service enterprise expendi- 
tures, such as the airport, water district and the port, 
from our calculation of the total city budget. T h e  total 
city budget figure is taken from the "Annual Appro- 
priations Ordinance, 1976," Board of Supervisors, 
San Francisco City and County. This document is 
available from the Board of Supervisors' office. 
l7This figure was derived in the following manner. 
In 1976 there were 23,785 total permanent city em- 
ployees. From this figure we subtracted 1,689 employ- 
ees working in public service enterprises to derive the 
number of employees funded by the total city budget 
(22,096). There were 7,596 employees in the school, 
wellare, and hospital departments combined. Sub- 
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Expenditures in the departments in- 
cluded in our budget model include roughly 
65 percent of the discretionary city budget: 
the other 35 percent was excluded from our 
analysis in order to simplify the collection 
and interpretation of the data. Departments 
were excluded when either their structure or 
jurisdiction drastically changed over the 
thirty-two-year period of the analysis. An 
example is the Public Works Depart- 
ment, which was continually reorganized 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, with sep- 
arate Public Works Accounts, General Of- 
fice, and Administrative Departments 
eventually being established. 
Department Employment Trends 
T o  analyze the city's response to changes 
in the prices of labor inputs, we begin with a 
listing of the number of permanent em- 
ployees through the period 1945 - 76 in each 
department included in our study (seeTable 
1). These numbers are derived from figures 
presented in the annual "Salary Ordi- 
nance," which is approved by the Board of 
Supervisors (BOS).18 
It is a major deficiency of the figures pre- 
sented in Table 1 that they exclude tempo- 
rary employees; but accurate counts of 
either total or department temporary city 
employees are difficult, if not impossible, to 
derive. A rough estimate is that there were 
4,000 temporary workers in 1976 when total 
permanent city employment was 22,096.19 
Many temporary employees hold jobs that 
are temporary in nature, such as assistants in 
the library or seasonal clerical workers in the 
assessor's office. Some, however, serve as 
direct substitutes for permanent employ- 
tracting them left 14,500 employees in the discretion- 
ary city budget, or 66% of the employees funded by the 
total city budget. 
lSThese figures are the number of approved perma- 
nent employees. Some of these approved slots are 
vacant because they are not budgeted positions. Others 
are vacant only on a temporary basis, from retirement 
or quits. Unfortunately, there is no way to determine 
the actual number of budgeted permanent employees 
in each department. 
1gFrank Levy and Michael Wiseman estimate that 
there were 3,764 temporary full-time employees in 
1972. See "An Expanded Public-Service Employment 
Program: Some Demand and Supply Considerations," 
Public Policy, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Winter 1975), pp. 105 - 34, 
esp. p. 114. 
ees.20 Because the exact number of tempo- 
rary workers in each department could not 
be included in Table 1, the figures there 
must be interpreted as approximations of 
personnel trends in city departments. 
The figures in Table 1 reveal a striking 
trend. The number of employees in depart- 
ments 10 - 18 grew rapidly in comparison to 
the number of employees in departments 
1 - 9. Most of the employees in the latter 
group are craft workers, police officers, fire- 
fighters, or transit drivers; most of those in 
the former, on the other hand, are other 
types of city employees-"miscellaneous." 
In other words, Table 1 reveals a shift in 
favor of the employment of miscellaneous 
workers relative to craft workers, police 
officers, firefighters, and transit drivers. 
Aside from temporary fluctuations, the em- 
ployment of craft workers, police officers, 
firefighters, and transit drivers has been 
either stable or decreasing in all depart- 
ments since 1955. In departments that utilize 
a mix of miscellaneous and craft workers, 
police officers, or transit drivers (such as the 
Police, MUNI, and Parks and Recreation 
Departments), there has been a strong shift 
in favor of the employment of miscellaneous 
personnel; the Fire Department stands out 
as an exception to this trenc, perhaps be- 
cause firefighter job tasks cannot be trans- 
ferred to miscellaneous employees. 
As previously noted, substantial increases 
occurred during this period in the wages 
and pensions of police officers, firefighters, 
transit drivers, and craft workers relative to 
those received by miscellaneous city em- 
ployees. The rapid growth in the number of 
miscellaneous employees relative to the 
number of police officers, firefighters, 
transit drivers, and craft workers thus pro- 
vides evidence of inter- and intra-depart- 
ment substitution in response to changes in 
the relative price of labor. The Police De- 
partment supplies a striking example of the 
city's response to high labor costs. Through- 
out the entire post-World War I1 period 
there has been a large increase in the crime 
ZOLevy and Wiseman (Ibid., pp. 113 - 14) suggest that 
temporary employees are utilized to avoid the retire- 
ment and health costs of permanent positions and to 
provide patronage by avoiding civil service regula- 
tions. 
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Table 1. Number of Permanent Employees 
in Various Departments, 1945 - 76. 
Department 1945 1950 1955 I960 1965 1970 1976 
1. Fire 
Firefighters 
Miscellaneous 
2. Police 
Police officers 
Miscellaneous 
3. MUNI, 
Drivers 
Miscellaneous 
4. Electricity 
5. Sewage & waste treatment 
6. Street cleaning 
7. Sewer repair 
8. Street repair 
9. Parks and recreation 
Craft workers 
Miscellaneous 
10. Assessor 
11. City attorney 
12. District attorney 
13. Mayor 
14. BOS (staff only) 
15. Purchasing 
16. Controller 
17. Civil Service Commission 
18. Public library 
Total of departments listed 
Total of entire Citya 
- 
aThis figure includes all city employees except those working in such public service enterprises as the airport, 
water district, and the port. Except for a few craft workers, all city employees that work in departments other than the 
18 included in our sample are miscellaneous employees. By including the police, fire, and MUNI departments in our 
sample, we oversample departments that contain employees other than miscellaneous personnel. Given this over- 
sampling of nonmiscellaneous personnel, the fact that total employment in departments 1 through 18 is falling over 
time as a fraction of total city employment is further evidence of the relative increase in the number of miscellaneous 
employees that occurred in San Francisco over the post-World War I1 period. 
Source: Figures are from the annual "Salary Ordinance" by the Board of Supervisors, San Francisco City and 
County, for 1945 - 76. 
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rate in San F r a n c i s c ~ . ~ ~  Clearly, demand 
pressures should have led to a large increase 
in the number of police officers. From 1950 
to 1970, growth did occur in the number of 
police officers, though not on the scale one 
might have expected.22 The number of 
police officers grew 7 percent (from 1793 to 
1918) over this twenty-year period; yet total 
permanent employment in the city grew 
36 percent (from 15,143 to 20,574). From 
1970 to 1976, the number of police officers 
decreased sharply, bringing the size of the 
police force in 1976 to slightly below the 
1950 figure. This 1970- 76 reduction in 
numbers coincides with the sharp increases 
in pension benefits received by police dur- 
ing those years.z3 The overall stability in the 
size of the police force from 1950 to 1976, in 
spite of increased demand, coincides with 
the large absolute and relative increases that 
occurred in the price of police officers over 
this period. 
The growth in the number of miscella- 
neous employees working in the Police 
Department from 1950 to 1976, however, 
provides clear evidence of the increased 
demand for police services during those 
years. Apparently, rather than hire expen- 
sive police officers to meet that demand, the 
city increasingly hired relatively inexpen- 
sive miscellaneous (civilian) employees.24 
tracting them left 14,500 employees in the discretion- 
ary city budget, or 66% of the employees funded by the 
total city budget. 
Z1As an example of the increasing crime rate, from 
1945 to 1974 the number of murders in San Francisco 
increased 260% (from 49 to 180). Over the same period 
the number of robberies increased 194% (from 1511 to 
4436). See Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Number 
of Offenses Known to the Police," Uniform Crime 
Reports, (Washington, D.C.: F.B.I., 1945), Table 37, 
and (1974), Table 6. 
2% this comparison 1950 is taken as the starting 
point because factors associated with the war effort 
depressed the number of police officers in 1945. 
2'From 1970 to 1976 the city's pension contribution 
per payroll dollar for police increased 172% (from 
27.26 to 73.9P). See Harry C. Katz, The Impact of 
Public Employee Unions on City Budgeting and 
Employee Remuneration-A Case Study of San Fran- 
cisco (forthcoming, Garland Publishing). 
24For example, in 1976 the annual base salary and 
pensions cost of a patrolman in the police force were 
$33,930 while those of miscellaneous employees in the 
police department were $13,390. The base salary is the 
annual salary employees receive after working for the 
The substitution of miscellaneous employ- 
ees for police officers took many forms in a 
variety of traffic, clerical, and administra- 
tive duties. 
Evidence of the city's response to changes 
in labor costs is also provided in the Street 
Cleaning Department. Employment in 
that department is largely made upof street- 
sweepers. In 1972, streetsweepers were re- 
classified from miscellaneous to craft pay 
status, a change that caused a large jump 
in their wagesz5 From 1972 to 1973, alone, 
they increased $2,000-from $11,300 to 
$13,300 a year. The city responded by 
sharply reducing the number of street- 
sweepers, even resorting to layoffs. In 1972, 
the number of streetsweepers stood at 192 
and total department employment was 346 
employees. By 1976, there were only 144 
streetsweepers and 283 total employees in 
the Street Cleaning Department. 
Department Expenditures 
The number and mix of personnel 
throughout city departments appear to 
have been adjusted in response to changes in 
the relative prices of labor. But the question 
remains whether these adjustments have 
been guided by an interdepartment alloca- 
tion process that has itself responded to 
changes in the prices of labor. As mentioned 
earlier, the price of labor to the city govern- 
ment of San Francisco is derived in wage- 
and pension-setting procedures that are 
separate from the procedures that set de- 
partment budgetary appropriations. There- 
fore, if we can model the budgetary appro- 
priations process, we can speak of the per- 
sonnel figures as an outcome of the appro- 
priations and pay-setting procedures. 
We model department appropriations as 
a product of a constant-shares allocation 
rule with adjustments to that rule in re- 
sponse to changes in the relative prices of 
labor used in each department. Equation 1 
is our model of departmental appropria- 
tions. 
city for three years. Police officers receive higher 
salaries only upon promotion to higher ranks. 
25For a description of the legal and political events 
that surrounded that reclassification, see Katz, The 
Impact of Public Employee Unions, p. 44. 
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+ (a,+ a ,  AWRPRLB,) . ATODEX 
Xi,t -I  
TODEX,-I + U i ~ t  
where: 
xi,, = appropriations in departments i in 
year t;26 
AWRPRLBi = the percentage change be- 
tween vears t and t - 1 in the ratio of de- 
partment i's price of labor (wage and pen- 
sion costs) and the average price of labor 
used by the city, weighted by the share of 
department i's expenditures that are paid 
to labor in year t - 1.27 The larger is labor's 
share of a department's expenditures, the 
more will a relative price adjustment 
affect that department's expenditures. T o  
account for this, the variable A,WRPRLBi 
is computed by weighting the percent- 
age change in department i's relative 
price of labor by the share of department 
i's expenditures paid to labor; 
TODEX, = the total discretionary budget 
in year t. ATODEX is the change in the 
total discretionary budget between years 
t and t - 1; and 
u ~ , ~  is an error term. 
Our model distinguishes between the 
treatment of a base level department appro- 
priation of funds used tocontinue the previ- 
26Department expenditure data are taken from the 
Board of Supervisors, Annual Appropriations Ordi- 
nance, San Francisco City and County, various years. 
These figures represent annual appropriated budgets. 
For a sample of departments we were able to compare 
actual expenditure data with appropriated budgets- 
they rarely differed by more than 5%. Appropriations 
include salaries for temporary workers, and although 
we were unable to identify the number of temporary 
- .  
employees, we did pick up payments to temporary 
employees in our analysisof deparunentexpenditures. 
2 i ~ h e  department p*ice of labor was cdmputed as 
the sum of average wage costs and pension costs. Pen- 
sion costs per payroll dollar were taken from the 
Employees Retirement System-Annual Report 1976- 
77. Average wage costs were computed as a weighted 
average of the number of employees in each job title 
times the maximum base salary for each job title. The 
number of employees in each job title and the maxi- 
mum base salary for each job title were derived from 
figures in the Board of Supervisors, (annual) Salary 
Ordinance, San Francisco, various years. These docu- 
ments are available from the Board of Supervisors' 
office. 
ous year's level of department expenditures, 
and the treatment of new funds made avail- 
able by an increase in the total discretionary 
budget. The sum ( a l  + f12 AWRPRLBi) 
measures the extent to which expenditures 
in department i in year t are set by continu- 
ing the previous year's expenditure level of 
department i. If a constant-shares allocation 
rule guides the allocation process, then 
coefficient a ,  will be equal to one. If the 
base-level appropriation of department i is 
reallocated away from department i when 
that department's relative price of labor in- 
creases, then coefficient f12 will be less than 
zero. 
If a constant-shares allocation rule is in 
effect, then department i would receive a 
constant share of the increase in the total 
discretionary budget. The variable ATO- 
DEX (the change in the total discretionary 
budget between years t and t - 1 ) times 
Xi,! -I  (department i's share of the total TODEXt-I 
discretionary budget in year t -1) measures 
the amount by which department i's expend- 
itures would increase if department i re- 
ceived its full share of the increase in the 
total discretionary budget. Therefore, if a 
constant-shares allocation rule is in effect, 
coefficient a ,  will be equal to one. 
Coefficient a, measures how much of the 
increase in the total discretionary budget is 
allocated in response to changes in relative 
labor prices. If increases in the total budget 
are allocated away from departments whose 
relative price of labor has increased, then 
coefficient a ,  will be less than zero. 
Estimation of Equation 1 poses two econ- 
ometric problems. First, the equation con- 
tains heteroskedastic error terms. Second, 
if serial correlation is present in the equa- 
tion, then estimates of the coefficients will 
be biased by the correlation between these 
serially correlated error terms and the lagged 
department variable, which is included as 
an independent variable. Let us assume that 
the error term in Equation 1 is proportional 
to the size of the department (u , ,~  =ei,t .Xi,t-l).28 
28A potential avenue for further research is specifica- 
tion of an error components model that would identify 
time- and department-specific components of the 
error term in Equation 2. 
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We can then avoid both of these econometric 
problems by dividing through by X , ,  , - I  in 
Equation 1 to derive Equation 2, the equa- 
tion we actually estimate. 
The results of the estimation are: 
= 1.043 + .348 AWRPRLB, + (3) q - - 1  
(.006)"" (. 159)" 
ATODEX (.385 - .784 AWRPRLB,). TODEX,- l  
(.073)"* (1.414) 
R2 = .13; DW = 1.94 
The number in parentheses under each 
coefficient is its standard error. 
The equation was adjusted for first-order 
serial correlation using an iterative 
Cochrane-Orcutt technique. 
"Coefficient is significantly different 
from 0 at the .05 level (two-tailed 
significance test). 
""Coefficient is significantly different 
from 0 at the .O1 level. 
Equation 3 is a pooled time-series and 
cross-section regression. It was estimated 
using ordinary least squares for our sample 
of seventeen departments for the years 1945- 
76. The constant term in Equation 3 is equal 
to 1.043. Of interest to us is the fact that this 
coefficient is significantly different from 1 
at the one percent level. This means that in 
addition to merely continuing the previous 
year's level of expenditures, department 
expenditures increase at a 4 percent trend 
rate. The fact that 8, is .385 and is signifi- 
cantly greater than zero implies that, along 
with the trend growth in department ex- 
penditures, a large fraction (38.5 percent) of 
the increase in the total discretionary budget 
is allocated on the basis of the department's 
previous share of the total budget. 
The positive and statistically significant 
coefficient ( 8,) on the first relative labor 
price variable implies that increases in the 
relative price of previously budgeted em- 
ployees are being funded with increased de- 
partment appropriations. In contrast, the 
coefficient ( &, ) on the second relative labor 
price variable is negative. This implies that 
increases in the total discretionary budget 
are allocated away from departments whose 
relative price of labor has increased. How- 
ever, $, is not statistically different from 
zero, and so this result must be interpreted 
with caution. 
Our budget model asserts that a distinc- 
tion can be made between the treatment of a 
department's base-level appropriation, 
which is merely a continuation of the de- 
partment's previous year's level of expendi- 
tures, and the treatment of new funds that 
arise from an increase in the total discretion- 
ary budget. T o  test this hypothesis we es- 
timate a version of Equation 2 in which 
a, and a, are constrained to be equal and 
a, and a, are constrained to be equal. This 
constrained equation does not allow for dif- 
ferential treatment of base level and new 
funds. Utilizing an F test we find that the 
unconstrained equation (Equation 3) per- 
forms better than the constrained equation 
in explaining changes in department ex- 
penditures at the one percent level of sig- 
nificance where F = 34 > F,,,  (2,506) = 4.6. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from these 
econometric results. First, a constant-shares 
allocation rule appears to influence depart- 
ment appropriations substantially. Second, 
new funds provided by an increase in the 
total discretionary budget are allocated 
away from those departments whose rela- 
tive price of labor has increased, while funds 
that are used to continue a past (or base) 
level of department expenditures are not re- 
allocated in response to price effects. 
Departments can alter their labor costs in 
two ways: change the number or type of 
personnel. The possibility of alteration of 
the mix of employees in a department sug- 
gests that it is somewhat inaccurate to speak 
as though the price of labor functions as an 
exogenous variable in the determination 
of department allocations. Given that de- 
partments can change their price of labor by 
changing their mix of employees, the caus- 
ality between a department budget and the 
department relative price of labor goes both 
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ways. Derivation of a more precise measure 
of the relative price elasticity of department 
expenditures would require estimation of a 
system of simultaneous equations. How- 
ever, almost all of the departments that we 
studied utilize essentially one type of labor, 
either miscellaneous employees, police 
officers, firefighters, transit drivers, or craft 
workers. Consequently, ignoring the caus- 
ality going from department expenditures 
to the relative price of department labor 
probably did not seriously bias our estimate 
of the relative price adjustment. 
Department Shares 
Table 2 lists each department's expendi- 
tures as a share of the total discretionary 
budget. The figures illustrate the stability of 
department shares. Departments 10 - 18 are 
relatively small departments; hence their 
expenditures and shares are more unstable. 
The Police Department again serves as a 
useful example of the overall trend. From 
1945 to 1976, the Police Department's share 
of the total discretionary budget rose 12.7 
percent (from 18.9 to 21.3). This modest 
growth occurred in the face of a large in- 
crease in crime rates and presumably a sharp 
increase in the demand for police services. 
We can now see the sources of the large 
increase in the number of miscellaneous 
personnel. Departments for which the rela- 
tive price of labor was falling generally con- 
tinued to receive their normal share of the 
increase in the total city budget. T o  con- 
sume their share of the budget increase, 
Table 2. Department Expenditures as Percentage Share 
of the Total Discretionary Budget, 1945 - 76. " 
Department 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 I970 1976 
1. Fire 
2. Police 
4. Electricity 
5. Sewage & Waste Treatment 
6. Street Cleaning 
7. Sewer Repair 
8. Street Repair 
9. Parks & Recreation 
10. Assessor 
11. City Attorney 
12. District Attorney 
13. Mayor 
14. Board of Supervisors 
15. Purchasing 
16. Controller 
17. Civil Service Comm. 
18. Public Library 
Other departments in the 
discretionary city budget 
"The total discretionary budget is all city expenditures other than expenditures on schools, hospitals, welfare, and 
capital construction. MUNI expenditures (department 3) are excluded from our budget model for the reasons 
described in footnote 15. 
Source: Figures are derived from data in the Annual Appropriations Ordinance, Board of Supervisors, San Fran- 
cisco City and County, various years. The documents are available from the Board of Supervisors' office. 
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these departments, which were utilizing 
relatively inexpensive labor, sharply in- 
creased their number of personnel. Con- 
versely, those departments in which the 
relative price of labor was increasing, such 
as the Police Department, could not hire 
many more employees since their share of 
the budget was also being held roughly 
constant. 
The dominance of constant-shares budget 
allocations could be interpreted as implying 
that budget makers possess a Cobb-Douglas 
utility function for department appropria- 
tions. The fraction of the total discretionary 
budget that determines adepartment's share 
could then be interpreted as the elasticity of 
that department's expenditures in the 
budget-maker's utility function. It is, how- 
ever, unclear to us who it is that is maximiz- 
ing this objective function or how they go 
about making the necessary maximiz- 
ing calculations. Instead, we interpret the 
constant-shares allocation as a product of a 
simple decision rule that arises out of an 
organizational budget struggle. Concerns 
for equity and internal struggles within the 
organization are more plausible explana- 
tions of constant-shares allocations than is 
an omnipotent objective function.29 
Labor's Share of Department Expenditures 
How did intradepartment expenditures 
change in response to changes in the price 
of labor? We seek to answer this question by 
identifying the extent to which the city re- 
sponded to increases in the price of labor by 
substituting capital for labor. Because we 
do not have a price index for capital, we 
cannot establish a proper estimation of any 
sort of production function for public ser- 
vices. We use, instead, the consumer price 
index to deflate the price of labor and de- 
rive an "absolute" price of labor (ABPRLB) 
for each de~artment. 
Equation 4 models the determination of 
labor's share of the expenditures in indi- 
vidual departments: the dependent variable 
"Greg Duncan finds that the maintenance of equal- 
ity of work loads guides the allocation of faculty slots 
within the University of California. See "Resource 
Allocation in a Public University: Perceived Equity 
and the Allocation of Faculty" (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of California, Berkeley, 1976). 
is the share of expenditures in department i 
in year t that is paid to labor.30 
(4) log LBSHDE,,, = ki+.147 log ABPRLBi,l 
(.038)** 
-.I98 log RLPRLB,,, -.003 log FRDDEX, , ,-, 
, , (.069)** (.0004)** 
R2 = 230; DW = 1.85 
The number in parentheses under each 
coefficient is its standard error. 
This equation was adjusted for first- 
order serial correlation. 
**Significantly different from 0 at the 
1 percent level (two-tailed significance 
test). 
where: 
ABPRLBi,, = the average price (wages 
plus pensions) of labor used in depart- 
ment i in year t deflated by the C.P.I. in- 
dex for the San Francisco-Oakland SMSA 
for year t ; S 1  
RLPRLBi,, = the average price of labor 
used in department i in ye& t divided by 
the average price of labor used in the city 
in year t; and 
FRDDEX,,,,,-, equals the difference be- 
tween expenditures in department i in 
years t and t- 1. 
This equation is estimated using ordinary 
least squares with pooled time series and 
cross-section data. Observations are in- 
cluded for our sample of 17 departments for 
the years 1945 - 76. The variables are all ex- 
pressed in logs so the coefficients can be 
interpreted  as^ elasticities. Our expenditure 
data only take account of operating appro- 
priations. Nonlabor expenditures are 
monies spent on materials, supplies, equip- 
ment, fixed charges, and other miscella- 
neous items. As mentioned earlier, the city 
lists capital construction expenditures in a 
'OLabor expenditures include salaries, wages, and 
overtime, holiday, and differential pay. 
)l"C.P.I. For Urban Wage Earners and Clerical 
Workers, San Francisco-Oakland, 1914 - ", Series A, 
pamphlet (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Washing- 
ton, D.C., 1977). 
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separate budget and, consequently, those - 
expenditures are excluded from our anal- 
ysis. 
The constant terms in Equation 4 are 
significant at the one percent level and ex- 
plain almost all of the variation in labor's 
share. Over all departments, labor's share of 
department expenditures averages 82.4 
percent. Equation 4 was transformed into a 
first difference equation and the change in 
labor's share was run against the change in 
the independent variables. With this specifi- 
cation the R2 dropped to .145, verifying the 
importance of the constant term as an ex- 
planation of the variation in labor's share of 
the expenditures in individual depart- 
men ts.32 
As with interdepartment allocations, 
labor's constant share of the expenditures 
of individual departments can be inter- 
preted in a standard economic framework. 
The fact that expenditures on labor form 
roughly a constant share of department ex- 
penditures can be interpreted as evidence 
that the production function in each depart- 
ment is Cobb-Dougla~.~~ However, this 
conclusion is unreasonable, because Cobb- 
Douglas production functions yield con- 
stant labor's share only if labor is paid its 
marginal product. Research described else- 
where reveals the strong influence that non- 
competitive factors exercise in the deter- 
mination of municipal employee pay rates 
in San F r a n c i ~ c o . ~ ~  It seems more reasonable 
to conclude that the stability in labor's 
share of the expenditures in individual 
departments is a product of a simple rule of 
32Equation 4 was separately reestimated for depart- 
ments 1 - 9 and departments 10 - 18. The coefficient 
estimates in these separate equations did not vary 
significantly from those reported in Equation 4. Use 
of a log functional form partially adjusts for hetero- 
skedasticity and is roughly equivalent to the assump- 
tion that the error terms inaease proportionately with 
the independent variables. No other efforts were made 
to adjust for heteroskedasticity in Equation 4. 
$%Borcherding and Deacon provide evidence of 
Cobb-Douglas production in the provision of non- 
federal public services. One could argue, however, 
that their discovery of labor's constant share of ex- 
penditures is evidence of the existence of a constant- 
shares budgetary rule. See Borcherding and Deacon, 
"The Demand for the Services." 
s4See Katz, "Municipal Pay Determination: The 
Case of San Francisco." 
thumb: in order to simplify the determina- 
tion of appropriate nonlabor expenditures, 
budget makers set nonlabor expenditures as 
a fixed percentage mark-up of department 
labor expenditures. 
The positive coefficient on the absolute 
price of the labor variable implies that 
within the department, as labor's price rises, 
maintenance, equipment and other non- 
labor expenses are postponed and labor 
costs are given top budgetary priority.35 
Our estimate, however, is that this adjust- 
ment is small: for every one percent change 
in the deflated price of labor, labor's share 
of the expenditures in individual depart- 
ments changes by only .15 ~ercent .~6 
The significance of the relative price term 
in Equation 4 can be interpreted as evidence 
of a centralized budgetary process. If the 
Board of Supervisors merely set the depart- 
ment budget total and then handed the 
money over to the department to do with as 
it saw fit, then relative labor prices would 
not affect intradepartment expenditures. 
The negative coefficient on the relative 
price term implies, however, that as a de- 
partment's labor becomes relatively more 
expensive, the department is forced by the 
Board of Supervisors to shift to a more cap- 
ital-intensive production technique. Again, 
our estimate is that this adjustment is rather 
small: for every one percent increase in the 
relative price of department labor, we esti- 
mate a .20 percent decrease in labor's share 
of department expenditures37 
The negative coefficient on the change 
in  department expenditures variable 
(FRDDEX) implies that departments are 
sluggish in their adjustments of personnel. 
When department expenditures abruptly 
35For evidence that labor costs are given top priority 
in the municipal budgetary process, see Crecine, 
Government Problem Solving, especially pp. 74 and 
203. 
s6This implies that for every one percent change in 
the deflated price of labor, the share of department 
expenditures going to nonlabor expenditures changes 
by only .68 percent. 
3% a first difference version of Equation 4, the 
change in the relative price of labor appeared with a 
positive sign and the coefficient was significant at the 
one percent level. For this reason the negative coeffi- 
cient on the relative price term in Equation 4 should 
be viewed with some skepticism. 
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increase (decrease), then labor's share of the 
expenditures in individual departments 
temporarily falls (rises). This is evidence of 
the fact that departments are constrained in 
their hiring and layoff procedures. The 
city's reluctance to lay off employees is also 
revealed in Table 1. Rarely does the number 
of personnel in a department decrease. An- 
alysis of city personnel records reveals that 
any reductions in personnel that do occur 
are typically made through attrition, quits, 
or retirement, rather than through layoffs. 
Equation 3 also provides evidence of this 
sluggish adjustment in personnel as it re- 
veals greater price responsiveness in new 
versus base-level appropriations. 
A1 ternatively, the negative coefficient 
on the change in department expenditures 
variable in Equation 4 may be explained by 
the fact that nonlabor expenditures, such as 
equipment purchases, are "lumpy." Given 
a large increase in department expenditures 
due to an unusual expenditure on equip- 
ment, it is only natural to expect that labor's 
share of the expenditures in a department 
would temporarily decrease. 
Summary 
Rather than postulate maximizing be- 
havior, as is commonly done in economic 
analyses of public budgeting, we use a hy- 
brid of the organizational and demands 
model of budgeting to test for the influence 
that adjustments in response to changes in 
the price of labor inputs exert on budget 
allocations. We find that a constant shares 
rule, supplemented by relative price ad- 
justments, guides interdepartment budget- 
ary allocations. Our observations support 
the claims of organizational models of 
budgeting. A simple decision rule, in this 
case constant shares, appears largely to de- 
termine interdepartment appropriations. 
The budget model we use allows for dif- 
ferent treatment of adepartment's base-level 
appropriation (the continuation of the 
previous year's expenditure level) and the 
treatment of new funds made available by an 
increase in the total city budget. We find 
evidence that new funds provided by an in- 
crease in the total city budget are allocated 
away from those departments in which the 
relative price of labor has increased while a 
department's base-level appropriation is 
not reallocated in response to price effects. 
In an explicit test of our hypothesis that 
new money is treated differently from 
money used to continue a department's 
previous year's spending level, we find that 
the performance of our model is statistically 
superior to that of a model that constrains 
budget makers to treat all money thesame. 
Intradepartment expenditures also ap- 
pear to be determined largely by a simple 
decision rule. Labor's share of the expendi- 
tures in individual departments is roughly 
held constant with minor adjustments in 
response to the price of labor. Adjustments 
that occur in personnel are rather sluggish. 
Personnel totals rarely decrease in a depart- 
ment because the city is reluctant to lay off 
employees. When personnel cuts are made, 
they are typically accomplished through 
attrition. 
Previous cross-sectional analyses of state 
and local government expenditures have 
concluded that the demand for labor in the 
public sector is price inelastic. In contrast, 
we find a considerable amount of price 
responsiveness in the municipal budgetary 
process. Specifically, using longitudinal 
data we find considerable evidence of adjust- 
ments in personnel and appropriations in 
response to changes in the price of labor 
inputs in the provision of public services in 
the city of San Francisco over the post- 
World War I1 period. In response to the 
rapid rise in the price of police officers, fire- 
fighters, transit drivers, and craft workers, 
the city essentially froze the number of such 
employees in a wide range of departments. 
This occurred even in the face of large in- 
creases in the demand for the services pro- 
vided by these employees, as with police 
officers. Over the same period the city sub- 
stantially increased the number of less ex- 
pensive miscellaneous employees. Longi- 
tudinal analysis of personnel trends in other 
cities may also discover much greater price 
responsiveness in public budgeting than 
that revealed in previous cross-sectional 
analyses. 
T o  the extent the figures in Tables 1 and2 
are representative of budget and personnel 
trends in other cities in California, they 
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may provide a partial explanation of the 
emergence of a "taxpayers' revolt" in Cali- 
fornia, which was signalled by the passage 
of Proposition 13 in June 1978.38The figures 
in those tables reveal that in San Francisco 
over the post-World War I1 period there was 
stability in the number of highly visible 
(and possibly greatly desired) employees in 
departments 1 through 9, such as police 
officers, firefighters, and street cleaners. 
Over the same period the number of clerical 
and administrative employees, who make 
up the bulk of personnel in departments 10 
through 18 (and other city departments), 
was increasing substantially. Taxpayers in 
San Francisco witnessed a large increase in 
the total city budget accompanied by no 
increase in the number of police officers, 
58This point was developed in conversations the 
author had with Frank Levy. 
firefighters, or street cleaners. It is possible 
that the dissatisfaction taxpayers in San 
Francisco and other California cities felt 
toward that trend contributed to the passage 
of Proposition 13. 
An important conclusion of our research 
is that it is fruitful to analyze the determina- 
tion of public services in a city context. Sig- 
nificant "economic" adjustments occurred 
within the San Francisco city budget. Varia- 
tions in the growth of personnel across de- 
partments that arose in response to changes 
in the relative price of labor were an im- 
portant avenue of price responsiveness in 
the supply of city services. Economic models 
typically concern themselves with the trade- 
off between public and private goods, a pat- 
tern that may lead observers to ignore im- 
portant economic adjustments that occur 
within the mix of services provided by pub- 
lic agencies. 

